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1.Introduction
An extensive body of both empirical and theoretical literature focuses on the relationship between the rate of 
inflation and inflation uncertainty. Recent studies by Brunner and Hess (1993), Evans and Watchel (1993), 
and Ball and Cecchetti (1990) find statistical support for a positive association between the rate of inflation 
and inflation uncertainty in the U.S.1 Theoretical  studies by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986),  Cukierman 
(1992)  and  Ball  (1992)  address  the  issue  of  the  direction  of  causality  between  inflation  and  inflation 
uncertainty.  Ball  claims  that  higher  inflation  creates  greater  inflation  uncertainty,  while  according  to 
Cukierman and Meltzer inflation uncertainty leads to higher average inflation due to opportunistic central 
bank  behavior.  More  recent  empirical  work  focuses  specifically  on  the  direction  of  causality  between 
inflation and inflation uncertainty. Holland (1995) finds that inflation raises inflation uncertainty in the U.S. 
and also that higher inflation uncertainty leads to lower average inflation due to stabilization motives of 
policymakers. Grier and Perry (1998) show that inflation significantly raises inflation uncertainty in all G-7 
countries  but  that  increased inflation uncertainty raises  inflation only in  Japan and France.  Evidence of 
stabilizing behavior is found in the U.S., U.K. and Germany where increased inflation uncertainty lowers 
average inflation. 
In the present study, following the methodology used in Grier and Perry,  we construct a  time series of 
monthly inflation uncertainty in Turkey from 1960-1998 using GARCH models and investigate the link 
between  inflation  and  inflation  uncertainty  using  Granger  tests.  The  results  of  these  tests  allow  us  to 
determine  whether  the  opportunistic  behavior  predicted  by  Cukierman  and  Meltzer,  or  the  stabilizing 
behavior described by Holland and Grier and Perry, prevails in Turkey over the full sample and various 
subsample periods. 
We find strong statistical support that inflation significantly raises inflation uncertainty in Turkey over the 
full sample period and three subsamples. Overall, stabilizing behavior seems to prevail, especially in the long 
run, since higher inflation uncertainty is associated with lower average inflation at some lag lengths in each 
sample period investigated. We find evidence of opportunistic behavior in the short run during the late 1980s 
and 1990s, where inflation uncertainty raises average inflation. Furthermore, an examination of the political 
conditions and the record of macroeconomic policymaking in Turkey between 1960-1998 reveal institutional 
and political factors that can help explain our empirical results. 
In section 2 we construct a time series of inflation uncertainty for Turkey. Sections 3 presents the empirical 
results, and in section 4 we discuss how the policy environment in Turkey over this period can help explain 
our empirical findings. Conclusions are presented in section 5. 
2.A GARCH Model for Inflation Uncertainty in Turkey
Our empirical results are based on the monthly Turkish CPI from January 1960-March 1998.2 Panel A of 
Table 1 shows the results of a times series model for the inflation rate that includes 8 lags of inflation and a 
12th order moving average term. Using standard Box-Jenkins techniques, we find that this is the best fitting 
time series model for Turkish inflation over the full sample period. Ljung-Box Q-tests on the residuals show 
no sign of autocorrelation up to 12 lags. However, the squared residuals are extremely correlated, indicating 
that the inflation error variance is significantly time-varying. Q2 test statistics for the presence of conditional 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals are significant at 4, 8 and 12 lags. Therefore, the null hypothesis of a 
constant error variance is rejected at the 0.05 level of significance. The AR(8)-12th order moving average 
regression model captures any pattern in the conditional mean of inflation, but does not account for the 
strong pattern in the conditional error variance. 
Panel B of Table 1 adds a GARCH(1,1) model of the conditional variance of inflation to the time series 
model of the conditional mean of inflation.3 Ljung-Box Q-statistics for the residuals of the GARCH model 
are shown in panel B and reveal no pattern in either the residuals or squared residuals. The AR(8), MA(12) - 
GARCH(1,1)  model  seems to  fit  both  the  mean and  variance  of  Turkish  inflation  well.  The  estimated 
conditional  variance  of  inflation  (σ2
ε t)is  used  as  our  time  series  measure  of  inflation  uncertainty  in 
subsequent Granger tests of the relationship between the rate of inflation and inflation uncertainty. 
3. Empirical Results
The results of Granger-causality tests for Turkish inflation and inflation uncertainty are reported in Table 2. 
Panel A shows that over the full sample period, the null hypothesis that inflation does not Granger-cause 
inflation uncertainty is rejected at the 0.01 level using 4, 8, 12, 16 or 24 lags. Furthermore, since the sum of 
the coefficients is positive in all cases, these results indicate that an increase in the Turkish inflation rate 
"Granger-causes" greater inflation uncertainty.4 The null hypothesis that uncertainty does not Granger-cause 
inflation is also rejected at the 0.01 level for all lags. The sum of the coefficients on lagged uncertainty in the 
inflation equation is negative, indicating that increased inflation uncertainty leads to lower future inflation 
over the full sample period in Turkey. Increased inflation first raises inflation uncertainty, which creates real 
economic costs, and then leads to monetary tightening and stabilization to lower subsequent inflation. 
We next investigate various sub-sample periods and report these results in panels B, C and D in Table 2. In 
each sample period, the procedure outlined above is used to estimate equations (1) and (2). The best time 
series  model  for  inflation  is  determined  for  each  period  using  standard  Box-Jenkins  techniques,  and  a 
GARCH(1,1) model is used to generate a time series estimate of inflation uncertainty with information from 
that time period only.5 A summary of these results follows. 
For all three sub-sample periods, as was the case for the full sample period, the effect of inflation on inflation 
uncertainty is consistently positive and significant (see panels B-D). At all lag lengths and in all sample 
periods, we find that higher inflation is associated with higher average inflation uncertainty at the 0.01 level 
of significance. Therefore,  we find strong statistical  support  that  higher average inflation raises inflation 
uncertainty in Turkey over all sample periods investigated. 
Test results for whether inflation uncertainty lowers or raises subsequent inflation are mixed. During the 
1980-1998  period  (Table  2,  Panel  B),  we  find  only  limited  evidence  of  stabilizing  behavior.  Inflation 
uncertainty lowers inflation at 4 and 12 lags at the 0.10 and 0.05 level of significance, respectively. At 8, 16 
and 24 lags we find no statistically significant relationship between inflation uncertainty and inflation.
Over the 1986-1998 period (Table 2, Panel C) we find evidence in the short run of the opportunistic policy 
behavior predicted by Cukierman and Meltzer. Inflation uncertainty is associated with significantly (0.01 
level) higher levels of inflation at 4 and 8 month lags. However, at longer lag lengths of 12, 16 and 24 
months  inflation  uncertainty  significantly  (0.01  level)  lowers  average  inflation,  indicating  stabilizing 
behavior in the long run. 
Similar results are found during the 1990s (Table 2, Panel D), where inflation uncertainty first raises average 
inflation and then leads to lower inflation in the long run. At lags of 4, 8 and 12 months during this period, 
inflation uncertainty is associated with significantly higher inflation, indicating opportunistic policy behavior 
in the short run. Evidence of stabilizing behavior is found in the long run, since inflation uncertainty lowers 
average inflation after a 16 month lag. 
Our main empirical results show while inflation unambiguously raises inflation uncertainty in Turkey, the 
effect of inflation uncertainty on subsequent inflation depends on the time period considered. In the full 
sample, and in all sub-samples, we find at least some evidence of stabilization, since increased inflation 
uncertainty always leads to lower inflation, especially at longer lags. There is also some evidence of the 
opportunistic behavior predicted by Cukierman and Meltzer at lags of a year and less in the late 1980s and in 
the 1990s. This variation in policy responses can perhaps be explained by variation in the political and policy 
climate in Turkey during this period. 
4. Policy Discussion
Throughout the entire sample period, Central Bank (CB) policies were invariably accommodative, backing 
the government's development and industrialization policies and frequently monetizing the fiscal deficits that 
resulted. Before 1986, the CB used public-sector credits and interest rates as monetary policy instruments, 
but this type of money management began to change after 1986. The CB took important steps toward more 
autonomy by reorienting the monetary process toward contemporary central  bank practices. A switch to 
monetary reserve targeting was accompanied by a series of new legislation that allowed the CB to conduct 
open market  operations  and monitor  a  newly  established  interbank market.  These  reforms  were  further 
complemented by accords with the Treasury limiting the short-term credits that the government could use 
from the CB. However, despite these measures that could be interpreted as a move toward greater central 
bank independence, inflation and inflation variability continued to surge after 1990.
As shown in  panels  C and D of  Table 2,  we find evidence  of  the  opportunistic  central  bank behavior 
predicted by Cukierman and Meltzer during this period of CB transformation. For both the 1986-1998 and 
1990-1998 sub-sample periods, inflation uncertainty is associated with significantly higher levels of inflation. 
This is somewhat interesting since the steps taken toward increased central bank autonomy after 1986 should 
have resulted in stabilization rather than opportunistic behavior. One possible explanation is that our test 
seems to capture the policy motives of both macroeconomic policymakers in Turkey rather than specifically 
those of the CB. Throughout the sub-sample periods, the CB has in fact tried to stabilize inflation in spite of 
inflexible fiscal policies. For example, in an effort to reinstate its credibility as an autonomous monetary 
authority, the CB announced a monetary program for 1990. The CB initially met the stated monetary targets, 
but during the years that followed, a high turnover of CB governors and a rapid expansion of public-sector 
credits lowered the effectiveness of the monetary program.
Macroeconomic  mismanagement  in  the  early  1990s  also  added  to  inflation  uncertainty.  The  coalition 
governments of this period tried to disinflate while maintaining a high rate of economic growth. Rather than 
implementing a credible stabilization package, the coalition governments chose populist measures, such as 
maintaining an overvalued Turkish lira (TL), lowering interest rates, and strategically adjusting the prices of 
a wide range of goods and services produced by the state economic enterprises. An overvalued TL lowered 
the price pressure on domestic goods and also helped to improve the revaluation account included under the 
asset side of the CB's balance sheet, but that led to a worsening of the current account and to an increased 
inflow of high cost short-term capital. Domestic borrowing was kept at a minimum to avoid any upward 
pressure on interest rates that would increase the interest payments category of budgetary liabilities. But the 
Treasury's strategy of restricting the supply of government securities and cancelling (or delaying) auctions 
backfired,  causing  interest  rates  to  surge  instead.6 Thus,  in  view  of  rising  public-sector  borrowing 
requirements, these measures proved unsustainable, and the CB failed on numerous occasions to meet its 
monetary targets. Consequently, the financial crisis of 1994 ensued, and that led to the implementation of a 
stabilization program later in the same year.7 
After a short period of monetary and fiscal tightening, economic growth resumed in 1995. Inflation, after 
dropping from its all-time high levels in 1994 to 72 percent in 1995, gradually began to rise as upward price 
adjustment in the public sector followed.8 The CB responded with open market operations to stabilize the 
financial markets and in an accommodative fashion tried to control the liquidity level.9 Inflation continued to 
rise, and as efforts to lower the Treasury's reliance on CB resources began to show a sign of weakening, the 
Treasury and CB once again agreed to coordinate their efforts, this time to target inflation. Early data show 
that the strategy seemed to work, despite remaining concerns about the budget deficit and the unsettled issue 
of CB autonomy. 
From this brief examination of Turkey's disinflation experiment it is clear that the CB does not appear to be 
independent  of  macroeconomic  policymaking.  Stabilizing  behavior,  or  the  lack  of  it,  seemingly  is  the 
responsibility of both the fiscal and monetary authorities, and for the most part, the fiscal authority appears to 
have the upper hand. It should be noted that the fiscal authority has even more influence on monetary policy 
during periods of high turnover of coalition governments. For example, during the 1983-86 politically stable 
period, inflation and inflation variability remained relatively low, but frequent elections and governments that 
followed after 1987 led to an expanding budget that increasingly relied on CB resources. 
It is also clear that central bank independence can accomplish little without fiscal discipline. Recent studies 
show a significant relationship between inflation and budget deficits in Turkey.10 If Turkey is to become a 
single-digit inflation country, it seems almost imperative that the fiscal authority seriously consider ways to 
move away from inflationary bias. Then, it may be possible for the CB, as an autonomous entity, to stabilize 
the economy through sound monetary polices. True, the CB-Treasury alliance has attempted and to some 
extent succeeded in putting downward pressure on inflation, especially during the 1980-1987 period. But 
throughout  the  full  sample  period  and  particularly  during  the  1990s,  inflation  stabilization  not  only 
increasingly suffered from the problem of time inconsistency but also failed to produce a fiscal environment 
that would allow the CB to practice its autonomy.11
5. Conclusions
We find overwhelming evidence that increased inflation significantly raises inflation uncertainty in Turkey 
between 1960-1998 and in  various  sub-samples.  The  evidence  on  the  effect  of  inflation  uncertainty  on 
average  inflation  is  mixed  and  depends  on  the  time  period  examined.  Over  the  full  sample,  increased 
inflation uncertainty is associated with lower average inflation at all lags. In the two sub-sample periods that 
cover the last half of the 1980s and the 1990s, inflation uncertainty raises inflation over lags of a year and 
less. During those periods, increased inflation uncertainty leads to lower inflation at longer lags of between 
12-24 months. Thus, stabilizing policy behavior prevails overall in the long run, but opportunistic behavior is 
evident in the short run in the later sub-sample periods. 
An analysis of the political  environment in Turkey between 1960-1998 generally supports our empirical 
results. Over the full sample period, Turkey's fiscal and monetary authorities appear to be generally spending 
a concerted effort to disinflate, which is consistent with our empirical findings of stabilizing behavior overall. 
While the attempts to stabilize inflation seemed to work during the politically stable periods of the early 
1980s, the political instability that we document in the late 1980s and the 1990s resulted in opportunistic 
policy behavior. We speculate that the problems of time inconsistency, the lack of fiscal discipline, a high 
turnover of CB governors, and politically motivated monetary expansions were all contributing factors that 
led to opportunistic behavior and subsequently to periods of high inflation and inflation uncertainty. A move 
toward greater central bank independence in Turkey could help mitigate some of these outcomes in the future 
by creating an institutional framework that would reduce opportunistic behavior and increase the possibility 
that monetary stability would prevail. 
Endnotes
1 Holland (1984) reviews the earlier empirical literature.
2 Data was obtained from Global Financial Data.
3 Other representations of the (G)ARCH process are possible for the conditional inflation variance. We consider other estimations, 
but find that the GARCH(1,1) model is the best.
4 Standard Granger-causality models are a test of temporal ordering between two variables and do not reveal the sign of the 
relationship. Therefore, we also calculate and report the sum of the coefficients from each Granger equation to determine whether 
the Granger-causality, when found, is positive or negative. 
5 The results of the inflation times series model for the sub-sample periods are not reported to save space. Several additional 
subsample periods were considered, but because of unstable GARCH equations they were not suitable. 
6 As a result of this strategy, domestic borrowing in total budget financing requirements declined but the share of both foreign 
borrowing and short term credits from the CB rose.
7 Combining monetary, fiscal, and income policies, the 1994 stabilization program attempted to contract the economy to improve 
the imbalances in the real goods and financial markets. Some of the measures included a devaluation of the TL by 38.8 percent, 
gradual reduction of the short term credits from the CB, tax increases, and spending cuts.
8 Frequent changes of governments and other events such as the Turkey-EU customs union also created uncertainty in financial 
markets.
9 See Yapi and Kredi, Quarterly Economic Bulletin (p. 12, 1997/III).
10 See Everaert (1992), Abaan (1993), Ertel and Insel (1993), Sonmez (1994), and Ulengin (1995).
11 In Cukierman's (1992) central bank independence ratings, Turkey scores fairly high in terms of overall legal independence, 
ranking 16th highest out of 68 countries and far ahead of low inflation countries like Japan and France. As Cukierman emphasizes 
and as we document, the legal status of a central bank is only one of several factors that determine its actual independence. As we 
noted  previously,  Turkey  ranks  42nd  out  of  46  countries  in  a  separate  measure  by  Cukierman  of  "overall  central  bank 
independence", which more closely measures actual independence. 
*We thank Hesna Genay, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, for her insightful comments as discussant. 
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